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The weighted and directed network of countries based on the number of overseas banks is analyzed
in terms of its fragility to the banking crisis of one country. We use two different models to describe
transmission of shocks, one local and the other global. Depending on the original source of the
crisis, the overall size of crisis impacts is found to differ country by country. For the two-step local
spreading model, it is revealed that the scale of the first impact is determined by the out-strength,
the total number of overseas branches of the country at the origin of the crisis, while the second
impact becomes more serious if the in-strength at the origin is increased. For the global spreading
model, some countries named “triggers” are found to play important roles in shock transmission,
and the importance of the feed-forward-loop mechanism is pointed out. We also discuss practical
policy implications of the present work.
I. BACKGROUND
The increasing globalization provides important ad-
vantages in terms of risk sharing and risk diversification
in banking and financial markets, but it also facilitates
the risk spreading among different nations [1]. The recent
financial crisis or shock, originated from United States
(US) and spread to other countries, has witnessed that
many overseas banks cut back their loans to the local
markets and withdrew their representations. The with-
drawals cause the liquidity shortage of the host countries
which then lead to subsequent withdrawals of the host
countries’ overseas branches in the crisis attacked coun-
tries. This process can continue and the shocks in this
situation are hence defined as sequential shocks in this
study.
There are abundant literature on transmission mech-
anism of shocks in global banking: [2] examines how
Japanese asset bubbles have been transmitted to US via
lending responses of Japanese overseas banks in US in the
80’s; [3] explores the mechanism of 1998 Russian debt de-
fault as a negative liquidity shock to international bank-
ing and its impacts on the banking of Peru; [4] studies
the effect of financial distress in foreign parent banks on
the local SME (small and medium enterprises) financing
in 14 central and eastern European countries during the
early stage of the 2007 financial crisis.
Within the framework of complex network theory, this
paper introduces models for shock transmission and ex-
amines the different impacts of the sequential shocks on
the global banking network. We find that the damage of
the shocks is closely related to the directionality of the
edges and the network topology plays an important role.
∗ Corresponding author: beomjun@skku.edu
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ON COMPLEX
NETWORK METHODOLOGY
The research using complex system approach in bank-
ing has also experienced three stages of the development.
In the earlier stage, [6] claims that the possibility of con-
tagion effect depends on the structure of interbank link-
ages. They believe that a “complete structure of link-
ages” will share the risk more easily than “an incomplete
structure”, hence the risk sharing effect. [7] further con-
siders a structure of uni- and multi-money center banking
systems, where the banks on the periphery are linked to
the bank at the center but not to each other. Multi-tiered
banking system has then been examined with the simi-
lar approach. These researches have shown that schol-
ars have started to notice the banking structure has im-
pacts on contagion even though the models are simple
and has not yet formally introduced the complex sys-
tem theory. The second stage is symbolized by a con-
ference entitled “New Directions for Understanding Sys-
temic Risk”, which brought together experts from vari-
ous disciplines to explore parallels between systemic risk
in finance and systemic risk in engineering, ecology, and
other fields of sciences [8]. After that a series of interdis-
ciplinary researches using various modeling and theory
have emerged [9]. The 2007 US financial crisis becomes
another driving force of this line of the research. At this
stage researchers have started to apply complex system
theory to disclose topology and features of different fi-
nancial markets such as international trade network, in-
vestment network, interbank clearing network [10].
There are three issues in the current literature that
need to be addressed and can be improved: first, the
current research has focused on the disclosure of topol-
ogy of the financial network, the study on dynamics and
the interaction between the dynamics and topology are
limited; second, the application of knowledge from both
economics and complex system is rather mechanic; third,
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FIG. 1. (Color online) The international bank network drawn by using the software Gephi. The sizes of vertices are proportional
to the sum of the out-strength and the in-strength. Community detection algorithm [5] in Gephi yields clusters and we represent
them by different colors. Note that geographic locations of countries and community structures are closely related to each other.
the empirical research has mainly emphasized on two
markets, interbank and payment systems, where data are
relatively easy to obtain. Other markets, such as a global
banking network, have been hardly researched, hence the
focus of this research.
In this paper, “fragility” is defined as the reduction of
the number of banks as a result of exogenous shocks of
different sequence and different sizes. The initial shock
will generate rounds of sequential shocks at later stages
to propagate throughout the entire network. The initial
shock starts from the shock targeted country, such as US
in 2007; it then spreads to the hosting countries where
US has its overseas banks; resulting in more reduction of
banks. A financial crisis in this paper hence is a break-
down of the networks bank linkages, a collapse of all or
part of the network structure.
III. GLOBAL BANK NETWORK
A. The Database
The data used in this research is from Bankscope which
has information on over 30,000 public and private banks
throughout the world from 2009 to 2011. Each bank re-
port contains detailed consolidated and unconsolidated
balance sheet and income statement. Data comes from
Fitch Ratings and six other sources. It also provides
company and country risk ratings and reports, owner-
ship, and security and price information. This database
is produced by Bureau van Dijk.
The information in the database that can be used for
network construction are the number of branches and
subsidiaries that each parent bank has established over-
seas. Subsidiaries are banks that are completely or partly
owned and wholly controlled by parent banks that owns
more than half of the subsidiary’s stock. For the purpose
of this research subsidiary banks and branch banks are
equally treated as overseas banks. The information on
3the overseas location of the two types of banks can be
found in “ownership” category of the database.
B. The Topology of the Global Banking Network
By using gathered information, we construct the di-
rected and weighted network of N = 182 countries, in
which the directed arc from the country i to country j
is assigned the weight wij that is the number of banks
i puts in j. We in the present work focus on interna-
tional banks and thus domestic branches of banks are
disregarded, i.e., wii = 0. The number of arcs that has
nonzero weights amounts to M = 1055 (and thus the av-
erage out- and in-degree 5.80), which indicates that the
network is very sparse since the total number of possible
arcs is N(N − 1) = 32942, much larger than M .
The network in Fig. 1 is drawn by using the software
Gephi. Although sparse, the network is well connected:
the giant component size is comparable to the system
size and there are 6 isolated very small islands. The top
five countries in terms of vertex strengths in global net-
work are United Kingdom (UK), US, France, Germany
and Switzerland in this order. The top five countries
in terms of vertex strengths in Asia are Japan, China,
Hong Kong (HK), Singapore, and South Korea in this
order. In terms of in-degree the top five countries are
UK, US, Russia, Switzerland, France. It is interesting to
note that Panama island is ranked the six as one of the
famous offshore banks. The top five countries in Asia in
terms of in-degree, are Singapore, HK, China, Japan and
South Korea. In terms of out-degree the top five coun-
tries are UK, US, France, Germany and the Netherlands,
and in Asia they are Japan, China, South Korea, HK
and Singapore. As historical Asian international finan-
cial center, Singapore, Japan and HK are still playing
important roles, and China is gaining its momentum.
In general, the network shows that in-degree of a coun-
try is different from its out-degree. It implies that the
export of banking services of a nation is not equal to the
imports of banking service of the country. Hence ser-
vice trade imbalances are observed in the global banking
network. We identify ten clusters by using Gephi which
uses the community detection method in [5] and display
them in different colors in Fig. 1. It needs to be men-
tioned that even in this era of global finances, we still
observe the strong dependence on geographic locations
of countries. In Fig. 1, the different communities have
different colors and it is clearly seen that each commu-
nity is closely linked to each continent. Interestingly, our
finding is in contrast to the argument in the literature
that geographic distances do not play important roles
with the development of electronic banking [11].
IV. LOCAL SPREADING MODEL
A. Model Description: Local Spreading
In the present study, we propose two different models
for the spread of shocks. In the first model for the lo-
cal spreading, we focus on the initial spread of crisis by
considering the shock transmission procedure upto two
steps:
• As the original source of the banking crisis, the
country i is picked sequentially one by one.
• Step I (the first wave): Due to the country i’s do-
mestic banking crisis, i is forced to reduce its banks
abroad by the fraction α. The bigger is α, the more
serious is the original crisis.
• Step II (the second wave): Each country (j) where
i has its banks (i.e., wij > 0) realizes this change of
number of banks within country, and thus tries to
pull back its banks in i to reduce the future risk. We
assume that the country j tries to sell the assets it
has in i very quickly, and thus there is an inevitable
reduction of total values. We take into account this
reduction by introducing another parameter β so
that j closes down all the banks in i and then moves
the fraction 1−β of banks to other country k. The
larger is β, the more loss the country j has in i. For
the choice of k, we choose the country in which j
has the most banks (except for i). If there are more
than two countries with the maximum number of
banks, we choose the one at random.
For the directed and weighted networks, one can de-
fine the out-strength sout and the in-strength sin of each
vertex i as follows:
souti ≡
N∑
j=1
wij , (1)
sini ≡
N∑
j=1
wji, (2)
which simply correspond to the total number of overseas
banks i built, and the total number of foreign banks in
i, respectively. We also note that the total number of
foreign banks in the world satisfies B =
∑
i s
out
i =
∑
i s
in
i .
Within the local spreading model in this Section, the
size of global crisis caused by the country i is measured by
the change of numbers of banks in the whole world, after
each step (I and II). We denote B(0) as the total number
of foreign banks before any crisis, and B
(1)
i [B
(2)
i ] is the
total number of foreign banks after the first (the second)
wave in Step I (II) caused by the original crisis in i. The
seriousness of the first and the second waves is measured
by the quantity we call “impact” I defined by the change
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Local spreading model: The first impact and the second impact measured by the change of total number
of foreign banks is shown for different values of α and β. As α and β become larger (i.e., the seriousness of the first and the
second waves become stronger), the impact sizes also increase. The top 10 countries which cause the most serious crisis in the
first and the second waves are listed in Table I
of number of banks in the world:
I
(1)
i ≡ B(0) −B(1)i , (3)
I
(2)
i ≡ B(1)i −B(2)i . (4)
B. Impact Sizes: Local Spreading
Figure 2 displays the first impact and the second im-
pact caused by each country. It is clearly seen that the
sizes of impacts are very different from country to country
and that as the first and the second waves become more
serious (α and β become larger) the impact sizes also in-
crease. We also list the ten countries that have the high-
est values in I(1) and I(2) in Table I for α = β = 0.5. The
top countries which cause the biggest first impacts are
somehow different from those countries with the biggest
second impacts. Specifically, HK, Luxemberg, and Sin-
gapore are well known financial centers although they do
not have the biggest economy like US. The list in Table I
implies that the countries with the big first impact and
the countries with the big second impact can have very
different characteristics. In order to elaborate this, we
compare local node properties (in- and out-degrees and
strengths) with the impact sizes in Fig. 2. We observe
clear positive correlation between the strengths and the
impacts and conclude that the first impact is mostly de-
termined by the out-strength, while the second impact by
the in-strength. As a matter of fact, the observed strong
correlations between the strengths and the impacts are
not surprising at all, in view of our local spreading model
of banking crisis in Sec. IV A: The first wave (Step I) only
deals with the overseas bank of i and thus the reduction
of the number of banks are mostly determined by the
wij . On the other hand, the second wave (Step II) is
heavily influenced by how many foreign banks exist in i
and thus it should be closely related with wji. In detail,
the dependence of I
(1)
i on wij can be understood as fol-
lows: The number of banks B
(1)
i after the first wave is
written as B
(1)
i =
∑
jk w
′
jk, where w
′
jk is the value after
5TABLE I. Local spreading model: The list of the top 10 countries that caused the most serious first and the second impacts for
α = β = 0.5, corresponding to Fig. 2(e). We also list the top 10 countries that have the highest values in out-degree, in-degree,
out-strength, and in-strength.
Rank first impact second impact out-degree in-degree out-strength in-strength
1 United States (US) US US UK US US
2 France (FR) UK UK US FR UK
3 United Kingdom (UK) Hong Kong (HK) FR RU UK HK
4 Germany (DE) Luxembourg (LU) DE CH DE LU
5 Italy(IT) FR NL FR IT FR
6 Japan (JP) DE IT Panama island (PA) JP DE
7 The Netherlands (NL) CH JP DE CN RU
8 China (CN) Russia (RU) CA LU NL CH
9 Switzerland (CH) Brazil (BR) CH Australia (AT) CH BR
10 Canada (CA) Singapore (SG) Libya SG AT SG
Step I. Since the crisis occurred at i, we get
B
(1)
i =
∑
j 6=i,k
wjk +
∑
k
w′ik,
= B(0) −
∑
k
wik +
∑
k
b(1− α)wikc, (5)
where bxc is the floor of x, i.e., the largest integer not
greater than x. We then obtain
I
(1)
i = s
(out)
i −
∑
k
b(1− α)wikc. (6)
We note that as α → 1, I(1)i → s(out)i as also confirmed
in our simulations. When α is small but nonzero, one
can also understand I
(1)
i ≈ k(out)i since b(1 − α)wikc =
wik−1. The similar reasoning can also be applied for Step
II to understand I
(2)
i ≈ s(in)i for large β and I(2)i ≈ k(in)i
for small β. For intermediate values of α and β, the
detailed numbers of banks must be taken into account to
understand what happens in the bank network for Step
I and II.
In Table I, we also list the 10 countries which rank the
highest in terms of out-degree, in-degree, out-strength,
and in-strength. Although the top 10 list for the first
impact and the out-strength (and for the second impact
and the in-strength) look almost identical, there still exist
small differences.
C. Emergence of a New Superpower: Local
Spreading
One can define the superpower in our network in dif-
ferent ways. In terms of the out-degree, the out- and
the in-strengths, US is the superpower as can be seen in
Table I. On the other hand, in terms of the in-degree,
UK has the highest power. London has been playing the
financial center of the world for a long time, but our data
indicate that UK is the superpower only in terms of the
number of countries that had branches in UK. In terms
of the number of banks that are located within a country,
US is the most important country. We next study what
will happen if one country becomes the source of crisis
and thus collapses. From the simulation of our model,
it is found that if the origin of the crisis is US, UK be-
comes the financial center in terms of the in-degree and
the in-strength. On the other hand, if the crisis first oc-
curs in France, not US, but UK becomes the superpower
in terms of in-strength. In all other cases, US keeps its
position as superpower.
V. GLOBAL SPREADING MODEL
A. Model Description: Global Spreading
Our local spreading model in Sec. IV is not really
able to capture the iterative nature of shock transmis-
sion across the global bank network. In the present Sec-
tion, we introduce a global spreading model of shocks,
in which the banking crisis originating from the source
country spreads to other countries as follows:
• A country i is picked sequentially as the origin of
the banking crisis. The country i undergoes bank-
ing crisis and thus reduces the number of banks by
the fraction α in neighbor countries (initiation of
crisis). This step is identical to our local spreading
model in Sec. IV A.
• The country j from which i reduced banks in above
step calculates the loss of incoming banks between
the initial and the current states. If the fraction
is larger than γ (∈ [0, 1]) the country j realizes
that crisis is coming and also withdraws its banks
abroad by the fraction α in the same way as the
country i did in the above initiation step. α and
γ are the two parameters in the present model of
global spreading of shocks; the former controls how
6severe the crisis is and the latter works as a thresh-
old for the detection of the crisis. For simplicity the
same values of α and γ are assigned for all coun-
tries, respectively.
• The above step of reduction of banks is per-
formed iteratively and thus banking crisis propa-
gates across the global banking network. The pro-
cess stops when no more withdrawals of banks oc-
cur. This iterative nature makes the present global
spreading model different from the local spreading
model in Sec. IV. If γ is set to unity, the crisis
stops propagating beyond i’s neighbor countries,
and the outcome becomes identical to the Step I in
Sec. IV. As γ is decreased from unity, countries be-
come more fragile against baking crisis. The impact
of the source country i on the global outcome of
banking crisis is measured similarly to Sec. IV, and
we denote it as I
(g)
i with the superscript g meaning
global spreading:
I
(g)
i ≡ B(0) −B(g)i , (7)
where B(0) is the total number of banks before cri-
sis and B
(g)
i is the number of surviving banks in
the world after the global transmission of the shock
originating from i stops.
B. Impact Sizes: Global Spreading
We simulate the spread of crisis varying γ from 1.0
to 0.3 for α = 0.5. As γ becomes smaller than 0.3, all
countries become fragile unanimously without showing
significant differences. We also note that for γ & 0.5, the
impact values do not strongly depend on γ any longer.
Figure 3 shows the impact I
(g)
i in Eq. (7) caused by the
crisis originating from the country i with respect to (a)
the out-degree and (b) the out-strength of i at α = 0.5.
We observe that impacts are strongly correlated with the
out-degrees and the out-strengths. Although the general
increasing tendency of impact seen in Fig. 3 is an ex-
pected behavior (see discussion in Sec. IV B), the devi-
ation from the simple linear relation observed for some
countries for γ < 0.5 demands a better understanding.
In order to elucidate the origin of these outliers, we com-
pute the difference in impact values between γ = 0.3 and
γ = 1.0:
∆Ii ≡ I(g)i (γ = 0.3)− I(g)i (γ = 1.0), (8)
which measures additional network effect on top of the
first step of direct crisis spreading only to neighbor coun-
tries. [Note that I
(g)
i (γ = 1.0) has the same value as
I
(1)
i in Sec. IV A.] Consequently, the outliers in Fig. 3
are those countries with large values of ∆Ii. The top
10 countries with the highest ∆Ii are listed in Table II,
where we also include the total number Ncrisis of endan-
gered countries in which the loss fraction has exceeded γ
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Global spreading model: Scatter
plot for the impact (I
(g)
i ) versus (a) out-degree and (b) out-
strength, both for α = 0.5. When γ is larger than 0.5, impact
is approximately linear with respect to (a) the out-degree and
(b) the out-strength. For small values of γ, some countries ex-
hibit strong deviations from the linear relations. Outliers that
have impact values deviating much from linearity are marked
(see Table II for the symbols of those countries).
during the crisis propagation. When the crisis is initiated
from a country with ∆Ii ≈ 0, the crisis does not propa-
gate beyond the country’s direct neighbors and become
localized. We believe that our measure ∆Ii can properly
capture how big a systemic risk the country i can cause
in the global bank network.
When the crisis starts from i, i reduces the banks from
its direct neighbors (j’s) by the fraction α, and thus the
number of banks j loses is written as dαwije, where dxe is
the ceiling function returning the smallest integer not less
than x. When the loss fraction dαwije/
∑
k wkj is larger
than γ, the country j also reduces its banks from other
countries. Since dxe < x+ 1, the above condition that j
also reduces its banks from other countries is written as
γ
∑
k 6=i wkj − 1
α− γ < wij , (9)
for α > γ. From Eq. (9), j is expected to be vulner-
able to the crisis originating from i, if j has incoming
banks only from a few neighbors. It is to be emphasized
7TABLE II. Global spreading model: Top 10 countries of the
largest impact difference4I [see Eq. (8) and Fig. 3] are listed.
The number Ncrisis of countries which are brought into crisis
from the shock originating from those 10 countries are also
listed.
Name ∆I Ncrisis
United Arab Emirates (AE) 87 17
Jordan (JO) 66 18
Rwanda (RW) 62 18
United States (US) 42 12
Libya (LY) 35 15
The Netherlands (NL) 34 8
Iran (IR) 26 6
Saudi (SA) 25 2
Sweden (SE) 13 6
Austria (AT) 9 4
TABLE III. Global spreading model: The most vulnerable
10 countries with influence within top 20%. The values of
vulnerability (maxk wki/
∑
j wji) and influence (
∑
j wij) to-
gether with the number Nloops of feed-forward loops which has
the country as the root are listed (see text for more details).
Name vulnerability influence Nloops
Togo 1.0 27 10
Hong Kong 0.54 19 28
Kuwait 0.5 36 85
Greece 0.5 26 27
Sweden 0.5 20 11
South Africa 0.5 19 8
Colombia 0.43 15 14
Japan 0.375 77 223
Libya 0.34 35 64
India 0.34 31 57
Portugal 0.3 20 14
that the condition (9) is only a proxy since it does not
reflect the crisis propagating from countries other than
from the origin. In actual computer simulation of our
global spreading model, crisis can spread beyond direct
neighbors of the crisis origin.
What is the origin of the outlying behavior (the big
impact difference ∆I in Fig. 3)? In order to answer this,
we introduce the concept of “the trigger country” as fol-
lows: When the crisis from a source country i reaches a
trigger country j, the country j plays the role of the trig-
ger that although j does not directly contribute in the
impact difference ∆Ii of the source country i, j does so
indirectly by relaying the crisis to other countries, even-
tually bringing many other countries into crisis. Our def-
inition of the trigger country leads to the two conditions
the trigger country must satisfy: First, it is vulnerable to
the crisis of its incoming neighbors (vulnerability). Sec-
ond, it can affect other countries so that its outgoing
neighbors can also be in crisis (influence). The vulner-
ability of the country i can effectively be measured by
maxk wki/
∑
j wji, which is proportional to the risk that
i is driven to crisis by one of its incoming neighbors k.
The influence, the second ingredient to be a trigger, can
be measured by i’s outgoing strength
∑
j wij . We ex-
pect that these two local properties to gauge vulnera-
bility and influence can capture the possibility that a
country can be a trigger, although it is based on the
assumption that most contribution to ∆Ii comes from
i’s nearest and next-nearest neighbors. In Table III, the
most vulnerable 10 countries of which their values of in-
fluence rank within top 20% are listed. See Saudi in
Table II for example. Saudi ranks high by provoking the
trigger country Kuwait (Kuwait is the only one out-going
neighbor of Saudi that has become endangered). Kuwait
in Table III has higher values in both vulnerability and
influence, which leads us to conclude that our two mea-
sures, vulnerability and influence, can effectively capture
the possibility for a country to become a trigger country.
For the spread of crisis originating from United Arab
Emirates, Jordan, and Rwanda, it is found that Libya
and Togo play the role of the trigger countries, whereas
Sweden plays a role of the trigger for US and the Nether-
lands (see Table III).
To summarize, the outliers in Fig. 3 and Table II are
either countries which have triggers as their directly con-
nected neighbors (like United Arab Emirates, Jordan,
and Rwanda all with the trigger country Togo as their
neighbors), or trigger countries themselves (like Libya).
We also emphasize that a trigger country may not be an
outlier in Fig. 3 and Table II: The influence in Table III is
defined as the outgoing strength, and consequently takes
into account only the first wave impact. In contrast,
outliers are defined in such a way that only the impact
beyond the first wave is measured [see Eq. (8)]. Outliers
are those countries which exhibit big network effect be-
yond the direct connections, and we believe triggers are
conceptually useful to understand why some countries
become outliers.
We also observe that even when a country k does not
satisfy the condition (9) and thus survives the first step
of shock transmission from the origin country, it might
fall into crisis in the next step by the crisis propagating
from other country. Suppose that a country j which has
banks of the country i (wij > 0) opens branch banks in
another neighbor country k (wjk > 0), in which i also has
branch banks (wik > 0). In this situation, it is possible
that the crisis from the country i affects k both through
the direct path and the indirect path via the country j,
which is a typical example of the so-called “feed-forward
loop” with i as the root. If crisis from a source country
and a trigger country arrive at the target country through
the feed-forward loop, the target country is more likely
to fall into crisis. We measure the number Nloops of the
feed-forward loops and also include them in Table III.
To illustrate the process of spreading crisis through
feed-forward loops, we plot the subnetwork of spreading
8crisis which starts from Rwanda in Fig. 4 for α = 0.5 and
γ = 0.3. Among the nearest neighbors of Rwanda, the
only country which satisfies Eq. (9) to become endan-
gered is Libya. Not only Libya contributes much for the
increase of the impact value of Rwanda due to its large
value of influence (see Table III), it also plays an impor-
tant role by composing feed-forward loops: Rwanda and
Libya compose feed-forward loops together with Gambia
and Mali. Although the crisis from Rwanda affects Gam-
bia and Mali in the first step, these two survive because
the condition (9) is not fulfilled. However, in the second
step of shock transmission when Libya affects these two,
they eventually collapse into crisis from the feed-forward
loop mechanism. Eventually, all nine countries, Gam-
bia, Liberia, Guinea, Chad, Senegal, Niger, Mali, Benin,
and Sierra Leone become affected by the crisis originat-
ing from Rwanda through the the feed-forward loops with
Libya and Togo playing important roles (see Fig. 4). We
find that all eight countries except Saudi and Austria in
Table II become the victim of the crisis spread by the
feed-forward-loop mechanism.
Feed-forward loops can significantly increase the im-
pact of crisis beyond the simple sum of the impact of
local crisis from the trigger and the the source countries.
Without any feed-forward loops, it is easily seen that
Libya must have ∆I = 21, instead of the actual value
∆I = 35. From this, we conclude that the big impact
difference ∆I in global spreading comes from combina-
tion of two factors: large out-strength and feed-forward
loops. Especially, the effect of feed-forward loop from
the trigger country increases the number of endangered
countries significantly. Consequently, we conclude that
the existence of trigger countries with feed-forward loops
needs to be taken into account for forecasting the pat-
tern of crisis spreading across the whole bank network.
We note that the number of feed-forward loops is not the
only indicator for the big scale of crisis spread. For ex-
ample, although Japan has 233 feed-forward loops, many
of its neighbors are not vulnerable and thus they work as
cushion not as trigger for the crisis spread.
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
First, from the data, this research shows that for most
of countries in the world, their banking service accounts
are not balanced. Some have larger in-strength than out-
strength, such as UK. These countries have bank service
trade deficit because they import more than export. On
the contrary, other countries have bank service surplus as
they have larger out-strength than in-strength. Whether
a country has bank service surplus or deficit is a result of
their trade policy implemented. If countries decide to im-
plement an export-promote-trade policy, such as Japan
in 70s and 80s, they will end up with bank service trade
surplus, otherwise it is going to be deficit. This research
shows that the sequential shocks have different impacts
on these two types of countries. Export-oriented coun-
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Global spreading model: The subnet-
work of crisis spread with Rwanda as the crisis origin (α = 0.5
and γ = 0.3). Each country undergoes crisis through either
the direct mechanism [the condition (9) satisfied] or the feed-
forward-loop mechanism (see text for details). The numbers
on the directed edges are the weights (the number of over-
seas banks between two countries). The feed-forward-loop
mechanism eventually affects nine countries, Gambia, Liberia,
Guinea, Chad, Senegal, Niger, Mali, Benin, and Sierra Leone,
all colored red. The blue-colored countries are the ones for
which the direct crisis condition (9) is satisfied. In this sub-
network of crisis, Libya and Togo are the trigger countries
(see text).
tries need to prepare more “capital cushion” as they are
going to be exposed to the initial shock; however the
import-oriented countries also need to prepare enough
capital for the second round of the shock.
Second, as lender of last resorts, governments are ex-
pected to step in and provide safety nets for the crisis at-
tacked banking system. The size of the financial aid how-
ever is, in general, not easy to determine. This research
indicates that the variation of the shock sizes determine
the different impacts on the banking system measured
by the reduction number of the banks. The magnitude
of the reduction can provide certain information on the
seriousness of the effect, hence certain implication for the
size of the bailout packages.
Third, our results for the global spreading model sug-
gest that in order to prevent systemic risk from spreading
identification of countries with a big network effect is im-
portant. We also believe that our concept of the trigger
countries can be important for international intervention
to stop crisis spreading: The trigger countries can trigger
a big scale of risk spreading, but if they are provided some
international financial support in early stage of risk prop-
agation, they can also work as a bottle neck for spreading,
enhancing the stability of the whole international baking
network.
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